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MICHAEL BUXTON DEVINE*

The Application of EEC
Regulation 2641/84 on Illicit
Commercial Practices with Special
Reference to the U.S.A.**
On September 17, 1984, the Council of the European Economic Community (EEC Council) adopted Regulation 2641/84 "on the strengthening
of the common commercial policy with regard in particular to protection
against illicit commercial practices."' On December 9, 1985, the Commission of the European Economic Community (EEC Commission) received its first complaint under Regulation 2641/84; and on February 5,
1986, the EEC Commission published its "Notice of initiation of an examination procedure concerning illicit commercial practices within the
meaning of Regulation ... 2641/84, consisting of the exclusion from the
U.S. market of the unlicensed importation of certain aramid fiber manufactured by Akzo N.V. or its affiliated companies outside the United
States. ' 2 The complaint was lodged with the EEC Commission on behalf
of the Akzo Group by Enka B.V. of The Netherlands, the sole producer
of aramid fiber in the European Economic Community (EEC). 3 Specifically, the complaint alleged that:
*Des Moines, Iowa. Member of the Iowa, New York, and District of Columbia Bars.
B.A., 1976, St. Olaf College; M.P.A. & J.D., 1980, Drake University; Diploma in Advanced
International Legal Studies, 1986, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law,
Salzburg, Austria; LL.M. in International Business Legal Studies, 1988, University of Exeter, England.

**The Editorial Reviewer for this article is Thomas E. Shaw.
I. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2641/84 of 17 September 1984 on the Strengthening
of the Common Commercial Policy 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) I (1984) Ihereinafter

Initiated Complaint].
2. 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 25) 2 (1986) [hereinafter Initiated Complaint].
3. Id.
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The application of Section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 in the matter of
certain aramid fiber relating to a complaint filed by E. 1. du Pont de Nemours
and Co. constituted an illicit commercial practice of the U.S. Government, and
that the resulting order by the U.S. International Trade Commission . . . to
exclude from the U.S. market unlicensed importations of certain .

.

. aramid

fiber manufactured outside the United States by Akzo N.V. or its affiliated
companies
was thereby causing or threatening to cause injury to a Community
4
industry.

In the words of the editors of Common Market Law Reports:
This is the first proceeding under the Commercial Protection Regulation ...
which provides a framework for international retaliation by the EEC against
unfair trading practices by foreign countries which are not susceptible to antidumping procedure. It promises to be a case of major importance both for the
precedent it sets and for the
issues it raises as to the "judicialization" of
5
international trade disputes.

The purpose of this article is to determine whether an affirmative finding
of illicit commercial practices on the part of the United States Government
by the EEC Commission correctly applies Regulation 2641/84. Within the
framework of international law and custom the analysis focuses on: (I)
national and supranational legislation; and (2) national and supranational
litigation.
In considering national and supranational legislation the investigation
focuses on: (a) the substantive and procedural law of section 301 of the
U.S. Trade Act of 1974, as amended (section 301),6 as a basis for Regulation 2641/84; (b) the substantive and procedural law of Regulation
2641/847 as a response to section 301; and (c) analysis of both section 301

and Regulation 2641/84 with respect to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). 8

In considering national and supranational litigation the investigation
focuses on: (a) the specific allegations of illicit commercial practice and
injury in the complaint lodged by Enka B.V. pursuant to Regulation

2641/84 with the EEC Commission; (b) the substantive and procedural
law of section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (section
337),9 as the target of the complaint lodged by Enka B.V., and the rela-

tionship of GATT to section 337; (c) the specific allegations of unfair
practices in import trade and importation of products produced under

4. Id. (footnote omitted).
5. [1986] 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 410.
6. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-16 (Supp. IV 1986).
7. Reg. 2641/84, supra note 1.
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].

9. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337-1337a (Supp. IV 1986).
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process covered by claims of unexpired patent filed by E. I. du Pont de
Nemours and Co. against the Akzo Group pursuant to section 337 before
the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC); (d) the specific allegations alleged by the Akzo Group on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit as a result of a determination adverse to the Akzo
Group in the section 337 litigation before the USITC; and (e) analysis of
the section 337 allegations and of the Regulation 2641/84 allegations with
respect to international law and custom.
The investigation concludes that an affirmative finding of illicit commercial practices on the part of the U.S. Government by the EEC Commission incorrectly applies Regulation 2641/84 with respect to the complaint
lodged by Enka B.V.
!. The Background of EEC Regulation 2641/84
EEC Regulation 2641/84 on illicit commercial practices was drafted with
respect to the common commercial policy: (a) to defend vigorously the
legitimate trade interests of the EEC in bilateral and multilateral organizations, particularly the GATT, and (b) to ensure that the EEC acts with
as much speed and efficiency as its trading partners. 10 With the exception
of the antidumping procedures, until the adoption of Regulation 2641/84:
[Nbo, comparable procedures existed to address the situation where a nonmember country was engaging in trade practices which-in the Community's eyes-

was unfair to Community trade. Such situations could only be handled by the
Community on an ad hoc basis under the general provisions of Article 113 [of

the EEC Treaty], which left neither the Commission nor the Council with clear
authority to press a matter to prompt resolution. Compared to procedures
utilized by the Community's trading partners-particularly the United Statesthe Community felt that it lacked effective measures to move decisively against

unfair trade practices of others. II
Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, as amended, provided the
measures for the United States to move decisively against unfair trade
practices of others. Regulation 2641/84 was drafted as the counterpart in
the EEC to section 301 in the United States. 12 Regulation 2641/84 was
modeled after 13 and parallels 14 section 301. Although Regulation 2641/84

10. See Reg. 2641/84 supra note 1, at 1.
I1. Atwood, The European Economic Community's New Measures Against Unfair Practices in International Trade: Implications for United States Exporters, 19 INT'L LAw. 361,
362 (1985).
12. Zoller, Remedies for Unfair Trade: European and United States Views, 18 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 227 (1985).

13. Bronckers, Private Response to Foreign Unfair Trade Practices-United States and
EEC Complaint Procedures, 6 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 651, 715 (1984).
14. Atwood, supra note I1, at 361.
WINTER 1988
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was drafted in retaliation to section 301,15 both trade provisions have a
dual purpose: (1) to be used as a sword to eliminate economic injury
outside the EEC and the United States due to exports to nonmember and
foreign countries (the penetration of nondomestic markets) and (2) to be
used as a shield to eliminate economic injury inside the EEC and the
United States due to imports from6 nonmember and foreign countries (the
protection of domestic markets).'
In order to understand the dual purpose of Regulation 2641/84, it is first
necessary to understand the dual purpose of section 301. Therefore, the
investigation focuses on: (a) the substantive and procedural law of section
301 as a basis for Regulation 2641/84; (b) the substantive and procedural
law of Regulation 2641/84 as a response to section 301; and (c) the analysis
of section 301 and Regulation 2641/84 with respect to the GATT.

A.

THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LAW OF
SECTION 301 OF THE U.S. TRADE ACT OF 1974

Although the U.S. Constitution does not grant the right to import or
export to private parties and thus to engage in trade with foreign countries, 17 Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, as amended, is the
legal mechanism by which private parties may invoke the intervention of
the U.S. Government against foreign trade practices that limit the commerce of the United States. 18 As the power to regulate commerce is vested
in Congress by the Constitution, 19 the legislative branch of the U.S. Government had addressed itself to: dumping; 2° subsidization; 2 1 patent in-

15. Steenbergen. The New Commercial Policy Instrument, 22 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 421
(1985).
16. Borgeois & Laurent. Le "Noavel Instrtument de Politique Commerciale:" Un Pas en
Avent Vers L'alinination des Obstacles aux Echanges Internationaux, 21 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROP(X.N 41, 62 (1985).
17. Buttfield v. Stranhan, 192 U.S. 470. 493 (1904) (a statute which restrains the importation of particular goods does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution).
U.S. Exporters
Fisher & Steinhardt. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Protection fr
of Goods, Services, and Capital, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'i. Bus. 569, 570 (1982).

18. Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 17. at 571; Bronckers, supra note 13, at 660.
19. U.S. CoNs-r. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 17. at 570.
20. U.S. antidumping law provides that if foreign merchandise is sold in the United States
at less than its fair value, resulting in injury to a U.S. industry, an antidumping duty shall
be imposed upon such merchandise in an amount equal to the amount by which the foreign
market value exceeds the U.S. price for the merchandise. Tariff Act of 1930, § 731, 19
U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. IV 1986). Fisher & Steinhardt. supra note 17. at 571.

21. U.S. countervailing duty law provides that if a country is providing a subsidy with
respect to the manufacture, production, or exportation of merchandise which causes material
injury to a U.S. industry, there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a counterveiling
duty equal to the amount of the net subsidy. Tariff Act of 1930, § 701, 19 U.S.C. § 1671
(Supp. IV 1986). Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 571.
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fringement; 22 and fairly competing imports if they are a substantial cause
of serious injury to U.S. industry. 23 The purpose of section 301 is outside
these areas, however, and addresses itself to the enforcement of bilateral
and multilateral agreements to which the United States is a party. 24 Conceivably, the United States need not be a signatory to the trade agreement
invoked, so long as the United States can claim some vague right under
the agreement.2 5 Additionally, section 301 allows remedies outside those
26
specifically expressed in the particular trade agreement invoked.
1. The Substantive Law of Section 301
Congress has delegated its authority to the President to determine actions of "unfair" trade by foreign countries. Section 301 provides that
"the President shall take all appropriate and feasible action within his
power" 2 7 in order "to enforce the rights of the United States under any
trade agreement" 28 or "to respond to any act, policy, or practice of a
foreign country or instrumentality" 29 which "is inconsistent with the
provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under,
any trade agreement" 30 or "is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce." 3 1 In delegating its authority to the President, Congress has defined broad limits within which
the President can determine actions of "unfair" trade by foreign countries.
Section 301 defines "commerce" that it includes but is not limited to
"services (including transfers of information) associated with interna32
tional trade, whether or not such services are related to specific goods"
and "foreign direct investment by United States persons with implications
for trade in goods or services." 33 Thus, the power of the President extends
not only to goods but also to services and investment.

22. The President may embargo or issue cease and desist orders against patent infringing

foreign imports. Tariff Act of 1930, § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp. IV 1986). Fisher &
Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 571.
23. The President may provide relief from injury caused by import competition upon a
finding by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) that increased imports have
been the substantial cause of injury to a domestic industry. Trade Act of 1974, title II,19
U.S.C. §§ 2251-53 (Supp. IV 1986) (the "escape clause"). Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note
17, at 571.
24. Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 575.
25. Id. at 577.
26. Id.
27. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(l)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §

2411(a)(l)(A).
2411(a)(l)(B).
2411 (a)(l)(B)(i).
241 l(a)(1)(B)(ii).
2411 (e)(l)(A).
2411(e)(1)(B).

WINTER 1988
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Section 301 defines "unjustifiable" as "any act, policy, or practice
which is in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights
of the United States" 34 and includes but is not limited to "any act, policy,
or practice

. . .

which denies national or most favored nation treatment,

the right of establishment, or protection of intellectual property rights." 35
Any act by a foreign government may be "unjustifiable" and yet not
violate any international agreement. 36 It is arguable that unjustifiable practices include those that are not contrary to international agreements but
that violate the spirit if not the letter of such agreements. 37 It is also
arguable that international instruments, declarations, or state practices
that are not themselves agreements may also be included within the scope
38
of unjustifiable practices.
Section 301 defines "unreasonable" as "any act, policy, or practice
which, while not necessarily in violation of or inconsistent with the international legal rights of the United States, is otherwise deemed to be
unfair and inequitable." 39 It includes any act, policy, or practice that
denies fair and equitable "market opportunities"-40 or "opportunities for
the establishment of an enterprise" 4 1 or "provision of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights." 42 As with unjustifiable
acts, an act by a foreign government may be "unreasonable" and yet not
violate any international agreement. 43 Two interpretations of "unreasonable" may be used by the President: formalist and normative. 44 Under
the formalist interpretation, the "standard is likely to be highly deferential
to foreign governments, who might easilyjustify a particular trade practice
as a shrewd political or economic measure." 45 Under the normative interpretation, the standard "is significantly less deferential than the formalist
approach and allows the President to balance both the justifications for
and the international repercussions of a foreign trade practice in determining whether the practice is 'reasonable.' "46
Section 301 defines "discriminatory" as "where appropriate, any act,
policy, or practice which denies national or most favored nation treatment

34. Id. § 2411 (e)(4)(A).

35. Id. § 2411(e)(4)(B).
36. Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 597.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(3).
Id. § 241 I(e)(3)(A).
Id. § 2411(e)(3)(B).
Id. § 241 I(e)(3)(C).
Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 597, 598.

44. Id. at 598.
45. Id.

46. Id.
VOL. 22, NO. 4
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to U.S. goods, services, or investment." 47 The definition does not distinguish between national treatment and most favored nation treatment, either
of a single importer
of which may be "discriminatory." 48 The harassment 49
by a foreign government is clearly "discriminatory."
Section 301 provides with respect to potential remedies for unfair trade
practices that the President may exercise his authority as to any goods
or sector "on a nondiscriminatory basis or solely against the foreign
country or instrumentality involved" 50 and "without regard as to whether
or not such goods or sector were involved in the [particular] act, policy,
or practice." 5' Thus, pursuant to his powers under section 301, the President may exercise his authority with respect to widgets, for example,
against all widgets from all countries or specific widgets from specific
countries. The scope of the action the President may take is specifically
detailed. Section 301 provides that the President may "suspend, withdraw,
or prevent the application of, or refrain from proclaiming, benefits of trade
agreement concessions to carry out a trade agreement with the foreign
country. . . involved." 52 Section 301 also provides that the President may
"impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, fees or restrictions on the services
country or instrumentality for such time as he determines
of, such foreign
53
appropriate."
Section 301 also provides specific remedies for unfair trade with respect
to "service sector access authorization." 54 That term is defined as "any
license, permit, order, or other authorization, issued under the authority
of federal law, that permits a foreign supplier of services access to the
U.S. market in a service sector concerned." ' 55 The President may "restrict

47. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(e)(5).
48. A national treatment clause requires that imports into a particular country be accorded
equal treatment with goods domestically produced. This principle focuses on the relationship
between domestically produced goods and those imports from foreign countries. GATT,
supra note 8, art. Ill. Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 599.
A nation which is accorded most-favored-nation (M.F.N.) status by another country is
entitled to receive treatment for its imports equal to that accorded the most favored trading
partners of that country. There are two kinds of M.F.N. clauses: 1.conditional, and 2.
unconditional. Under the former, a nation is entitled to equal treatment of its exports only
so long as it extends equal treatment to the exports of the other nation. Under the latter,
reciprocal treatment is not required. GATT supra note 8,art. I, para. 1.Fisher & Steinhardt,
supra note 17, at 599.
49. Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 599.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

19 U.S.C. § 241 l(a)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
Id. § 2411(a)(2)(B).
Id. § 2411(b)(1).
Id. § 2411 (b)(2).
Id. § 2411(c).
Id. § 2411(e)(6).
WINTER 1988
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• . . the terms and conditions of any such authorization"
57
issuance of any such authorization."

56

or "deny the

2. The Procedural Law of Section 301
Although Congress has delegated its authority to the President to determine and remedy actions of unfair trade by foreign countries, 58 the
59
legislative branch of government has provided that either private parties
60
or a cabinet level department of the executive branch of government
or the President 6' may initiate the process in a manner that is consistent
with the procedures of the judicial branch of government.
Section 301 provides with respect to private parties that "any interested
person may file a petition with the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
requesting the President to take action. . . and setting forth the allegations
in support of the request." 62 The implementing regulations define "an
interested party" to include: "a producer or a commercial importer or
exporter of a product which is affected either by the failure to grant rights
to the United States under a trade agreement or by the act, policy, or
practice complained of";63 or "a trade association, a certified union or
group of workers which is representative of an industry engaged in the
manufacture, production or wholesale distribution in the United States
of a product so affected";64 or "any person representing a significant
economic interest affected either by the failure of a foreign government
to grant U.S. rights under a trade agreement or by the act, policy or
practice complained of in the petition." 65 An "an interested party" must
be "a party who has significant interest," de minimus allegations have
66
not prevailed.
If an "interested person" files a petition with the United States Trade
Representative, a cabinet-level department of the executive branch of
government, then the United States Trade Representative must review
the petition and determine within forty-five days of its receipt whether to
initiate an investigation. 67 The United States Trade Representative can

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. § 2411 (c)(1)(A).
Id. § 2411 (c)(I)(B).
Id. § 2411(a)-(c).
Id. § 2412(a)(1).
Id. § 2412(c)(1).
Id. § 2411(d)(I).
Id. § 2412(a)(1).
15 C.F.R. § 2006.0(b) (1988).
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added); Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 602.
19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2).
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issue either a negative determination or an affirmative determination. 68
In the case of a negative determination, when the United States Trade
Representative has decided not to initiate an investigation with respect
to a petition filed by an "interested person," the United States Trade
Representative "shall inform the petitioner of the reasons therefore and
shall publish notice of the determination, together with a summary of such
reasons, in the Federal Register.'' 69 In the case of an affirmative determination, when the United States Trade Representative has decided to
initiate an investigation with respect to a petition filed by an "interested
party," the United States Trade Representative: "shall initiate an investigation regarding the issues raised," 70 "shall publish a summary of the
petition in the Federal Register," '7' and "shall . . . provide opportunity

for the presentation of views concerning the issues, including a public
hearing," 72 either "within the thirty-day period after the date of the
determination ' 73 or "at such other time if. . . request therefore is made
74
by the petitioner or any interested person."
Section 301 provides a mechanism whereby the executive branch can
initiate an investigation on its own without a petition having been filed by
an interested person. 75 In this situation, "the Trade Representative shall
publish such determination in the Federal Register and such determination
shall be treated as an "affirmative determination" 76 of a petition filed by
77
an interested person.

Furthermore, section 301 provides a mechanism whereby the President
can initiate an investigation on his own without a petition having been
filed by an interested person. 78 In this situation, "the President shall
publish notice of his determination, including the reasons for the deter79
mination in the Federal Register."
Regardless of whether a private party, the executive branch of government, or the Executive himself initiated an investigation of"unfair" trade,
section 301 prescribes certain procedures that the United States Trade
Representative must follow. 80 First, section 301 provides that the United
68.
69.
ment,
70.

Id. § 2412(b)(1) (2).
Id. § 2412(b)(I). (The Federal Register, the official publication of the U.S. Governis like a European Gazette.)
19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2).

71. Id.

72. Id.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 2412(b)(2)(A).
§ 2412(b)(2)(B).
§ 2412(c)(I).

§ 2411(d)(l).

79. Id.
80. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2413, 2414 (Supp. IV 1986).
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States Trade Representative "shall request consultations with the foreign
country or instrumentality concerned" 8' and that "if the case involves a
trade agreement and a mutually acceptable resolution is not reached during the consultation period . . . specified in the agreement, the Trade
Representative shall promptly request proceedings on the matter under
the formal dispute settlement procedures provided under such agreement." 82 Second, section 301 provides that the United States Trade Representative "shall recommend to the President what action, if any, he
should take" 8 3 based on the investigations and consultations undertaken
by the United States Trade Representative. 84 It is arguable that when the
Executive himself determines that there has been an action of unfair trade
by a foreign country without a petition having been filed by an interested
person, or without a determination having been made by the United States
Trade Representative as if there had been a petition filed by an interested
person, that the President need not concern himself with consultations or
dispute settlement procedures, but may take unilateral action against the
85
foreign country.
3. Summary
Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, as amended, can be used
by private parties both as a sword and as a shield "to take a significant
86
and public step to enforce existing international trade agreements."
Section 301 can also be used by the President "to signal displeasure to a
87
foreign government over a present or pending foreign trade practice."
Strictly construed, section 301 allows the United States to take action
88
before exhausting international procedures.
B.

THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL

LAW OF

EEC

REGULATION

2641/84

EEC institutions have had exclusive authority in the area of commercial
policy since January 1, 1970.89 Member States individually no longer have

81. Id. § 2413(a).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 2411(a)(1).
84. Id.
85. See id.§ 2411(d)(1).
86. Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 575.
87. Id.
88. Zoller, supra note 12, at 242.
89. The European Court of Justice, the EEC counterpart to the U.S. Supreme Court,
derived the exclusiveness of the EEC's competence in international trade policy as of
January I, 1970, from article 113 of the EEC Treaty in Donckerwolke v. Procureur de La
Republique, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1921 (recital 32). Bronckers, supra note 13, at 714.
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the power to initiate retaliation against the practices of other countries
"whose illicit nature is evident from their incompatibility regarding international trade practices either with international law or with the generally
accepted rules." 90 Having addressed itself to dumping and subsidization 9'
as had the United States, 92 and having been the target of eleven of the
twenty-six investigations initiated under section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act
of 1974, as amended, from January 1, 1980, through August 31, 1984, 93 the
94
EEC's "New Instrument of Commercial Policy" (Regulation 2641/84)
became effective on September 23, 1984, 95 to provide "a potentially swift
and powerful tool in trade disputes with the United States and other countries," 96 but especially in response to section 301.97 Like section 301, Regulation 2641/84 addresses itself to the enforcement of bilateral and
multilateral agreements to which the Member States of the EEC are parties. 98 Unlike section 301, however, Regulation 2641/84 allows no remedies
outside those specifically addressed in the trade agreement invoked. 99

1. The Substantive Law of Regulation 2641/84
The Member States of the EEC have delegated their authority, through
article 113 of the EEC Treaty, to the EEC Council'0 0 and the EEC
90. Reg. 2641/84, supra note I, at I.
91. Present Reg. 2176/84, 27 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 201) 1 (1984) is not substantially
different from the then applicable Reg. 3017/79, 22 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 339) 1 (1979).
Steenbergen, supra note 15, at 421.
92. See supra notes 20-21.
93. In eleven cases investigations under section 301 were targeted against the entire
EEC or Member States. Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Korea, and Taiwan were each the object
of two investigations. Austria, Japan, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden were each the object
of one investigation. Bronckers, supra note 13, at 684-85.
Approximately fifty investigations were commenced in the decade between 1974 and 1984.
Bourgeois & Laurent, supra note 16, at 47.
94. Regulation 2641/84 is referred to as "The New Instrument of Commercial Policy."
Steenbergen, supra note 15, at 421; Bourgeois & Laurent, supra note 16, at 41.
95. Reg. 2641/84, supra note 1, at 6.
96. Atwood, supra note II, at 361.
97. Steenbergen, supra note 15, at 421 ; see supra notes 11 - 16, and accompanying text;
supra note 93.
98. Reg. 2641/84, supra note I, art. 2(l), at 2. The preamble to regulation 2641/84 states:
"Whereas in the light of experience and of the conclusions of the European Council of June
1982, which considered that it was of the highest importance to defend vigorously the
legitimate interests of the Community in the appropriate bodies, in particular GATT.
Id. at I, para. 7.
99. Reg. 2641/84, supra note I, arts. 2(20), 10(3), at 2, 5.
100. Article 145 of the EEC Treaty
gives the Council the responsibility of ensuring, "that the objects set out in this Treaty are attained."
and to that end, declares that the Council shall "ensure the coordination of the general economic policy
of the Member States" and "have power to take decisions." The Council is thus the chief legislator for
the Community.

Kearley, An American Researcher's Guide to European Communities Lail, and Literature,
75 LAw LIB. J. 52, 60-61 (1982) (footnote omitted).
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Commission' 0 ' to develop a common commercial policy with respect to
international trade.' 0 2 Regulation 2641/84 establishes procedures for the
EEC Commission to follow that are aimed at: "(a) responding to any illicit
commercial practice with a view to removing the injury resulting
therefrom" 0 3 and "(b) ensuring full exercise of the Community's rights
with regard to the commercial practices of third countries." 0 4 With respect to definitions of "illicit commercial practices" and "Community's
rights," Regulation 2641/84 provides that the former "shall be any international trade practices attributable to third countries which are incompatible with international law or with the generally accepted rules" 10 5 and
the latter "shall be those international trade rights of which it may avail
06
itself either under international law or under generally accepted rules." 1
Regulation 2641/84 provides with respect to potential remedies for either
of the two aims of the New Instrument of Commercial Policy that "any
commercial policy measures may be taken which are compatible with
existing international obligations and procedures."' 1 7 These include:
"suspension or withdrawal of any concession resulting from commercial
policy negotiations"; 0 8 or "the raising of existing customs duties or the
introduction of any other charge on imports";109 or "the introduction of
quantitative restrictions or any other measures modifying import or export
conditions or otherwise affecting trade with the third country
concerned."

110

2. The Procedural Law of Regulation 2641/84

Although the Member States of the EEC have delegated their authority
to the EEC Council to draft the legal mechanisms against, and to the EEC
Commission to determine and remedy actions of, "illicit" commercial
101. Article 155 of the EEC Treaty provides that the Commission is to:
ensure the proper functioning and development of the common market." primarily by: (I) overseeing

the enforcement of the Treaty and secondary legislation. (2) delivering iecommendations and opinions.
(3) making decisions of its own. (4) participating in the creation of legislation by other institutions
(proposing). and (5) implementing the budget. This can be reduced to two basic functions-the executive

task of seeing that Community laws are enforced and the legislative one of initiating proposals Ior new
laws.

Kearley, supra note 100, at 62 (footnote omitted).
102. Atwood, sutpra note 11, at 352. Articles 110-116 of the EEC Treaty regulate the

Member States' trade relations with nonmember states coordinating and absorbing national
policies gradually into a common commercial policy. LASOK, THE LAW OF rHiE ECONOMY
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIEs 339 (1980).
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
I10.

Reg. 2641/84, supra note I, art. l(a), at 2.
Id. art. l(b).
Id. art. 2(l).
Id. art. 2(2).
Id. art. 10(3), at 5.
Id. art. 10(3)(a).
Id. art. 10(3)(b).
Id. art. 10(3)(c).
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practices of third countries, Regulation 2641/84 provides that private parties and Member States may lodge complaints pertaining to international
trade practices and rights with the EEC Commission. III There are differences, however, in the kinds of complaints that can be lodged by private
parties and Member States. 112
Regulation 2641/84 provides with respect to private parties that "any
natural or legal person, or any association not having legal personality,
acting on behalf of a Community industry which considers that it has
suffered injury as a result of illicit commercial practices may lodge a
written complaint." 13 Regulation 2641/84 defines "Community industry"
as all Community producers: "of products identical or similar to the
product which is the subject of illicit practices or of products competing
directly with that product,"'' 4 or "who are consumers or processors of
the product which is the subject of illicit practices,"' 15 or "whose combined output constitutes a major proportion of total community production
of the products in question. ' "116 Thus, a private party may lodge a complaint only with respect to the first aim of the New Instrument of Commercial Policy: "responding to any illicit commercial practice with a view
to removing the injury resulting therefrom."''1 7 Because of the definition
of Community industry, however, strange results occur with respect to
when private parties may lodge a complaint under the first aim of the
New Instrument for Commercial Policy. As one commentator explains:
Consider the example of corporation A which is the only producer in the
Community of widgets because, for instance, it is the patent holder for widgets.
If this corporation encounters trade restrictions in country Z, its complaint
under the new instrument would be admissible, assuming that no other pro-

ducers in the Community manufacture identical or similar products. Now consider the position of another corporation B in the same Member State of a
similar size, having made comparable investments in gadgets. Other corporations in this Member State manufacture gadgets, yet only B exports these
gadgets to country Z. Were B to encounter trade restrictions in Z, however, it
could not successfully lodge a complaint under the new instrument!
The outcome is even more peculiar if one considers the possibility that one
and the same corporation C is the only producer of widgets, yet one of several
producers of gadgets in a Member State. Now suppose that C is the only
corporation in this Member State which exports widgets and gadgets to country

Z and that Z restricts these exports unfairly. C's complaint about the restriction

Ill. Id. arts. 3, 4, at 2-3.
112. Steenbergen, supra note 15, at 423.
113.
Id. art. 3(1).
114. Id. art. 2(4).

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. art. 1(a), at 2.
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on widgets would be admissible, but a complaint about the restriction on gadgets
would not be admissible under the new instrument. 118
Regulation 2641/84 provides with respect to Member States that "any
Member State may ask the Commission to initiate the procedures referred
to in article 1.-' 119 Thus, Member States may lodge a complaint not only
20
with respect to the first aim of the New Instrument of Commercial Policy
but also the second: "ensuring full exercise of the Community's rights
with regard to the commercial practices of third countries." 12 , Private
122
parties cannot lodge a complaint under this second aim.
Private parties or Member States lodging a complaint of illicit commercial practices with the EEC Commission under the first aim of Regulation 2641/84 must submit proof thereof and the injury resulting
therefrom. 123 An examination of injury will focus on "the volume of
Community imports or exports concerned"; 124 "the prices of the Community producers' competitors"; 12 5 and "the consequent impact on Com126
munity industry ... as indicated by trends in certain economic factors."
An examination of threat of injury will also focus on "whether it is clearly
foreseeable that a particular situation is likely to develop into actual injury." 127 Specific considerations include "the rate of increase of exports
to the market where the competition with Community products is taking
place" 128 and "export capacity in the country of origin or export, which
29
is already in existence or will be operational in the foreseeable future." 1
Member States lodging a complaint of the Community's rights with the
EEC Commission under the second aim of Regulation 264 1/84 must "sup30
ply the Commission with the necessary evidence to support its request."
After a complaint is lodged with the EEC Commission by either a private
party or a Member State, the complaint is discussed in an advisory committee consisting of representatives of each of the Member States and the

118. Bronckers, supra note 13, at 738 (emphasis in original).

119. Reg. 2641/84, supra note 1, art. 4, at 3.
120. See supra note 117.
121. Reg. 2641/84, supra note I, art. l(b), at 2.
122. Id. arts. 3(), 4, at 2-3.

123. Id.arts. 3(2), 4(1).
124. Id.art. 8(l)(a), at 4.
125. Id. art. 8(l)(b).
126. The economic factors include: I. production; 2. utilization of capacity; 3. stocks; 4.
sales; 5. market share; 6. prices (depression or prevention of normally occurring increases);
7. profits; 8. return on capital; 9. investment; and 10. employment. Id. art. 8(l)(c), at 4.
127. Id. art. 8(2), at 5.
128. Id. art. 8(2)(a).

129. Id.art. 8(2)(b).
130. Id. art. 4(2), at 3.
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EEC Commission.13' Specifically, "consultations shall be initiated at the
132
request of a Member State or on the initiative of the Commission."'
After consultation in the advisory committee and "it is apparent to the
Commission that there is sufficient evidence to justify an examination
procedure and that it is necessary in the interest of the Community," the
EEC Commission will proceed with an examination. 133 The EEC Commission must take three steps: "announce the initiation of an examination
procedure in the Official Journal of the European Communities"; 134 "officially notify the representatives of the country or countries which are
135
the subject of the procedure, with whom ... consultations may be held";
and "conduct the examination at Community level, acting in cooperation

with the Member States."' 136 The Member States must supply the EEC
Commission with all necessary information. 137 The EEC Commission is
not required to hear the parties, but it may do so.' 38 It is required to hear
the parties, however, "if they have, within the period prescribed in the
notice published in the Official Journal of the European Communities,

made a written request for a hearing showing that they are a party primarily concerned by the result of the procedure." 1 39 Additionally, upon
request, the EEC Commission must give the parties primarily concerned
an opportunity to meet so that opposing views and rebuttal argument may
be presented. 140 Failure by a party to attend such a meeting is not deemed
prejudicial to that party's case; 14 1 however, "when the information requested by the Commission is not supplied within a reasonable time or
where the investigation is significantly impeded, findings may be made
42
on the basis of the facts available."1
The examination procedure may be terminated at any time if and when
either the third country involved takes measures that are deemed satisfactory to the EEC Commission 14 3 or international procedures require
the EEC Commission to drop the case as Regulation 2641/84 provides
only that "commercial policy measures may be taken which are com131. Id. art. 5(l), at 3.
132. Id. art. 5(2).
133. Id. art. 6(1), at 3.
134. Id. art. 6(f)(a).

135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. art. 6(I)(b).
Id. art. 6(1)(c).
Id. art. 6(3).
Id. art. 6(5), at 4.

139. Id.

140. Id. art. 6(6).
141. Id.
142. Id. art. 6(7).

143. Id. art. 9, at 5.
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patible with existing international obligations and procedures."' 144 After
the completion of the examination procedure, potential remedies may or
may not be adopted. Potential remedies will not be adopted if either the
EEC Commission decides not to propose any measure to the EEC Council
45
or the EEC Council rejects measures proposed by the EEC Commission. 1
3. Summary
EEC Regulation 2641/84 can be used by private parties and the EEC
Commission both as a sword and as a shield to eliminate injury and to
enforce rights within the framework of international agreements. Strictly
construed, Regulation 2641/84 does not allow the EEC to take action
before exhausting international procedures, and then only with respect
to trade in goods and not with respect to trade in services or investment. 146
C.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF GATT TO SECTION
AND REGULATION 2641/84

301

To the extent that U.S. domestic law conforms to GATT, the international agreement forms the foundation of U.S. trade law. 147 Although the
U.S. Congress has never ratified GATT, any argument to the contrary is
now purely academic. 148 The EEC's status regarding GATT is uncertain;
however, in practice the position is one of partial succession to the position
of the individual Member States. 149 The European Court of Justice has
determined that the EEC is bound by GATT obligations previously undertaken or accepted by Member States prior to their membership in the
EEC. 150 Thus, GATT dominates the field of international trade regulation
with respect to the United States and the EEC.
The procedures for resolving disputes between or among the Contracting Parties to GATT are found in three sources: articles XXII and XXIII;
articles dealing with specific subject areas; and nontariff barrier agreements concluded in the Tokyo Round. 15 1 The remedies provided52in the
Tokyo Round closely parallel those of articles XXII and XXII1.1
144. Id. art. 10(3), at 5.
145. Id. art. 12, at 6.

146. Bourgeois & Laurent, supra note 16, 48-49.
147. Jackson, The Changing International Law Framework for Exports: The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 14 GA. J. COMP. & INr'L L. 505 (1984); Note, Foreign
Industrial Targeting: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a Remedy, 25 VA. J. INT'L L.

483, 493 (1985).
148. E. MCGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL. TRADE REGULATION 73 (1986).
149. Id. at 100.
150. E. McGOVERN, supra note 148, at 100 (citing International Fruit Co. v. Produktechap
voor Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219).
151. E. McGovERN, supra note 148, at 32.
152. Id.
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Article XXII of GATT is entitled "Consultation" and provides:
1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall
afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as
may be made by another contracting party with respect to any matter affecting
the operation of this Agreement.
2. The Contracting Parties may, at the request of a contracting party, consult
with any contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has
not been possible to find a satisfactory solution through consultation under
Paragraph 1.153

Thus, it is clear that contracting parties to GATT must consult with each
other before unilateral retaliation may be taken.
Article XXIII of GATT is entitled "Nullification or Impairment" and
provides:
I. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly
or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the
attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under
this Agreement, or
(b) the application of another contracting party of any measure, whether or
not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a
view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations
or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be
concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties
concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described
in paragraph I(c) of this article, the matter may be referred to the Contracting
Parties. The Contracting Parties shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting
parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as
appropriate. If the Contracting Parties consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or
parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of
such concessions or other obligations under
this Agreement as they determine
54
to be appropriate in the circumstances. 1

Thus, it is clear under GATT that unilateral retaliation may be taken only
with the approval of the Contracting Parties to GATT, and only after
consultation has failed.
Concerning the relationship of GATT to section 301 of the U.S. Trade
Act of 1974, as amended, it is clear that the legislative branch of the U.S.
Government has extended the scope of authority of the executive branch
of the U.S. Government beyond the rules of GATT with respect to re-

153. GATT, supra note 8, art. XXII.
154. Id. art. XXIII.
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taliatory dispute settlement.1 55 Section 301 empowers the President to
pass independent judgment on the propriety and expedience of retaliatory
action without regard to GATT norms and procedures. 56 As could be
expected, "adoption of section 301 initially provoked bitter criticism from
United States trading partners (notably the European Economic Community) who suspected that the United States would henceforth bypass
the GATT by unilaterally imposing its own conception of fairness in in57
ternational trade." '
Concerning the relationship of GATT to EEC Regulation 2641/84, it is
clear that the Regulation merely provides that retaliatory measures must
be compatible with existing international obligations and procedures.1 58
The EEC Council will only impose retaliatory measures after it has been
authorized to do so by the Contracting Parties to GATT, and only if the
EEC Council considers that such action is necessary for the interest of
159
the EEC.

D.

CONCLUSION

The definition of illicit commercial practices in Regulation 2641/84, as
opposed to the definition of "unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory" commercial practices in section 301, occupies a middle ground
between two extremes. 160 On one hand:
the Commission wanted to avoid a particularized listing of specific practices,
an approach which inevitably would raise issues of compartmentalization and
create the risk of gaps or under-inclusion. On the other hand, the Community
wanted to avoid a catch-all approach such as that in section 301 of the United
States Trade Act-reaching practices that were "unjustifiable, unreasonable or
discriminatory"--on the grounds that such an approach would be too unstructured and arbitrary, might itself create the risk of Community actions in violation
of GATT, and could raise excessive expectations among Community industries
16
of official protective action which could not realistically be met. '

The EEC intended to avoid either extreme by adoption of a standard of
unfair trade in Regulation 2641/84 based on international obligations and
generally accepted rules of trade conduct. 162 Despite their differences in
defining acts of unfair trade, both section 301 and Regulation 2641/84
illustrate unilateral responses to international offenses. 16 3 Both instru155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Bronckers, supra note 13, at 661.
Id. at 666.
Id.
Id. at 747.
Id.
Atwood, supra note 11, at 363.
Id.
Id.
Zoller, supra note 12, at 229.
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ments authorize a state to enforce its rights by taking countermeasures
against a second state which,64in the opinion of the first state, has violated
an international obligation.1
In considering unilateral responses to international offenses of trade
practices, several comparisons may be made between section 301 and
Regulation 2641/84. First, we previously stated, section 301 aims to respond to unfair trade practices, whereas Regulation 2641/84 is directed
toward illicit commercial practices.165 Second, section 301 does not require injury as a prerequisite for investigation, whereas Regulation
2641/84 explicitly requires that a party suffer injury or threat of injury
before bringing a claim. 166 Third, under section 301 the United States
may take action either "to enforce" U.S. rights or "to respond" to a
foreign practice, whereas under Regulation 2641/84 the EEC may act
either "to respond" to a foreign trade practice or "to ensure full exercise"
of the EEC's rights.167 Fourth, in responding to a breach of an international obligation, section 301 requires that the violation must be "inconsistent with" a trade agreement or an act "unjustifiable, unreasonable,
or discriminatory." Regulation 2641/84, on the other hand, requires that
the violation must be a practice "incompatible with international law or
with generally accepted rules."' 168 Fifth, section 301 authorizes the President of the United States to take "all appropriate and feasible action,"
whereas Regulation 2641/84 provides only for measures "compatible with
existing international obligations and procedures." 169 It should be noted
however, that:
both instruments subject enforcement actions to preliminary diplomatic steps.
Section 303 of the Trade Act formally requires the Trade Representative to

"request consultations with the foreign country." It specifies that whenever a
trade agreement is invoked, proceedings must be requested "under the [formal
dispute settlement procedures found within the] agreement." Similarly, article
6 of the European Regulation requires the Commission not only to notify the
representatives of the country concerned, but also to consult with them. In
addition, article 13 precludes action until the parties have exhausted interna-

164. Id.at 229-30.
165. Id. at 234.
166. Id.
167. Id.

168. Id.at 235.
169. Id. at 239.
Neither section 301 nor regulation 2641/84 contemplates judicial review of decisions made
by the President and by the EEC Council. Judicial review of presidential actions under
section 301 would most likely be precluded under the "political question" doctrine. Judicial
review of actions of the EEC Council under regulation 2641/84 most likely would be precluded by EEC Treaty art. 173(2) as a decision having a general character cannot be challenged by an individual unless the decision is of direct concern to that individual. Id. at
244.
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tional proceedings for consultation and dispute settlement. These approaches
are consistent with article 33 of the United Nations Charter, which requires
70
states to settle their disputes through peaceful means. 1

The major feature shared by both section 301 and Regulation 2641/84
is that private parties as well as public authorities may bring-"file" under
section 301 and "lodge" under Regulation 2641/84-complaints against
foreign countries. 171 Under both section 301 and Regulation 2641/84:
[Pirivate complaints permit private parties to commence full-fledged legal battles
against foreign states. Although the initial action is not brought in a court, the
individual's right is nevertheless against a foreign sovereign. Governmental
trade regulations, no matter how unfair, are nonetheless genuine acts of state
which are not comparable to commercial activities. Trade regulations are acts
jure imperii which, in theory, should be immune. However, neither [section 301
nor Regulation 2641/84] articulates a reasonable limitation on the types of government actions that may be challenged. This ability of private parties to question the validity of certain foreign legislative acts represents an important
departurefrom classicalforeign sovereign immunity law, under which states
72
were only challenged by other states through diplomatic channels. 1

Regulation 2641/84 basically grants the same power to act on behalf of
the EEC as section 301 grants to the United States. 73 Both Regulation
2641/84 and section 301 support the legitimacy of resorting to coercive
devices during international negotiations and dispute settlement procedures. 174 Coercive devices, however, are not fully consistent with international law when used against states that have not clearly breached
international obligations. 175
Since the adoption of Regulation 2641/84, the EEC can use the following
commercial policy instruments as a sword to safeguard its export opportunities: (1)Regulation 2641/84, article l(a) if injury is caused by illicit
trade practices attributable to third countries; (2) Regulation 2641/84, article l(b), or retaliatory measures under GATT, or any other rules of
international law governing the issues between the parties, when commercial practices of third countries infringe the EEC's rights under international law or generally accepted rules, even if no injury to EEC
industry is proven. 176 Since the adoption of Regulation 2641/84, the EEC
can use the following commercial policy instruments as a shield to protect
EEC industry against imports: (1)Regulation 2176/84 if injury is caused
by state subsidies or dumping against undertakings; (2) Regulation
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Zoller, supra note 12, at 241-42 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 230-31.
Id. at 231-32 (emphasis added).
Id.at 242.
Id.
Id.
Steenbergen, supra note 15, at 435-36.
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2641/84, article l(a) if injury is caused by other illicit commercial practices
attributable to third countries; (3) Regulation 2641/84, article 1(b), or
retaliatory measures under GATT, or any other rules of international law
governing the issue between the parties, where commercial practices of
third countries infringe the EEC's rights under international law or generally accepted rules, even if no injury to EEC industry is proven; and
(4) general safeguard clauses such as Regulation 288/82 where EEC in77
dustry suffers damage caused by imports. 1
In conclusion, Regulation 2641/84, from an EEC perspective, "combine[s] the benefits of international trade management by private litigation
with the benefits of the more traditional intergovernmental approach to
78
the management of international trade disputes." 1
I!. The Application of EEC Regulation 2641/84
On December 9, 1985, the EEC Commission received its first complaint
lodged under Regulation 2641/84.179 The Government of the United States
was alleged to have committed an illicit commercial practice consisting
of the exclusion from the U.S. market of the unlicensed importation of
certain aramid fiber manufactured by the Dutch company Akzo N.V. or
its affiliated companies outside the United States. 18t The USITC excluded
the goods in question pursuant to section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of
1930, as amended, as the result of litigation filed by E. I. du Pont de
Nemours and Co. 18'
In order to understand the application of Regulation 2641/84 against the
U.S. Government, investigation focuses on: (a) the specific allegations of
illicit commercial practice and injury in the complaint lodged with the
EEC Commission by Enka B.V. pursuant to Regulation 2641/84; (b) the
substantive and procedural law of section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of
1930, as amended (section 337), as the target of the complaint lodged by
Enka B.V., and the relationship of GATT to section 337; (c) the specific
allegations of unfair practices in import trade and importation of products
produced under process covered by claim of unexpired patent filed by
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. against the Akzo Group pursuant to
section 337 before the USITC; (d) the specific allegations alleged by the
Akzo Group on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
as a result of a determination adverse to the Akzo Group in the section

177. Id. at 435.
178. Id. at 437.
179. Initiated Complaint, supra note 2, at 2.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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337 litigation before the USITC; and (e) analysis of the section 337 allegations and of the Regulation 2641/84 allegations with respect to international law and custom.
A.

ALLEGED ILLICIT COMMERCIAL PRACTICE OF THE

U.S.

GOVERNMENT IN THE FIRST COMPLAINT

UNDER REGULATION

2641/84

On February 5, 1986, the EEC Commission initiated an examination
procedure with respect to the allegation of illicit commercial practice by
the U.S. Government. 182 On March 20, 1987, the EEC Commission reached
its conclusions with respect to the examination procedure. 8 3 Investigation focuses first on the substantive aspects of the examination procedure
and second on the substantive aspects of the conclusions of the examination procedure.
1. Substantive Aspects of the Examination Procedure

a. Complainant
The complaint was lodged on behalf of the Akzo Group by Enka B.V.,
84
The Netherlands, the sole producer of aramid fiber in the EEC.'
b. Products
The products subject to an alleged illicit commercial practice of the
U.S. Government were "certain aramid fibers in the form of fiber, yarn,
pulp, staple, chopped fiber, paper, felt, or fabric," made outside the United
States by "Akzo, N.V., Enka B.V., Aramid Maatschappij Vo.F., or Akzona, Inc., or any of their affiliated companies," or "other related business
entities," which, since the order of the USITC was issued on November
25, 1985, have been excluded from the United States for the remaining
life of a U.S. patent covering part of the spinning fiber process. 185 The
U.S. patent expires on October 23, 1990.186
The various forms of aramid fiber subject to the order of the USITC
fall under Common Customs Tariff Subheadings ex 51.01 A, ex 56.01 A,
and ex 59.01 B 1, and correspond to NIMEXE codes ex 51.01-03, ex
56.01-11, and ex 59.01-21.187

182. Id.
183. EEC Commission Press Release, Akzo: The Commission Decides to Initiate a Consultation and Dispute Settlement Procedure in GATT, I (March 20, 1987).
184. Initiated Complaint, supra note 2, at 2.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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c. Allegation of Illicit Commercial Practice
The USITC determined that Enka B.V. violated section 337 of the U.S.
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, in the unauthorized importation into the
United States, and in the sale of certain aramid fibers manufactured abroad
by a process that, if practiced in the United States, would infringe claim
13 of U.S. letters patent 3,767,765 with the tendency to substantially injure
an industry efficiently and economically operated in the United States. 188
Enka B.V. (Enka) alleged pursuant to Regulation 2641/84 that the procedure followed by the USITC in the aramid fiber case pursuant to section
337, and the resulting exclusion order, constituted for Enka's aramid fibers
a denial of national treatment in respect of the application of U.S. patent
law, which affects their internal sale in the United States. 189 Enka alleged
that such an exclusion order was not "necessary" for the protection of
patents, and therefore, not justified on the basis of GATT article XX(d), 190
which provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to
...the protection of patents .... 191

Specifically, the complaint alleged that the determination against Akzo
N.V. violated international obligations of the United States under GATT
article 11I(4), 192 which provides:
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution, or use.... 193
In support of this allegation, Enka claimed:
(a) Enka B.V. was subjected in the proceeding before the USITC to procedural
discrimination which would not have arisen in ordinary patent litigation in
federal courts as regards products manufactured in the United States;
(b) Enka B.V. was unable to raise counterclaims as regards alleged infringements by du Pont of Enka's U.S. process patent and to consolidate all of the

188. Id.

189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
GATT, supra note 153, art. XX(d).
Initiated Complaint, supra note 2.
193. GATT, supra note 153, art. 111(4).
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disputed patents in a single proceeding, as would have been possible in ordinary
patent litigation in federal courts as regards products manufactured in the United
States thus being dragged into the expense and harassment of multiple
proceedings;
(c) being deprived of the possibility to raise counterclaims, Enka B.V. was
unable to contest du Pont's standing of "U.S. aramid fiber industry" as would
have been the case in ordinary patent litigation in federal courts regarding
products manufactured in the United States since, according to the complaint,
there would be no U.S. aramid fiber industry, but with the infringement of
94
Enka's U.S. patent process.1

d. Allegation of Injury
Enka stated that it had been engaged in the research and development
of aramid fibers since the late 1960s, culminating in the construction of a
5,000-ton capacity aramid fiber plant that was expected to have been "on
stream" in early 1986.195 Prior to the exclusion order of the USITC, Enka
had projected exports of aramid fiber to the United States of some 1,000
tons by 1990. 196 Given the export capacity of the Akzo Group that was
in existence or would have been operational in the foreseeable future, and
the likelihood that 20 percent of the production resulting from that capacity
would have been destined for the U.S. market, Enka alleged that the
exclusion order of the USITC would cause material injury to the complainant through the direct loss of sales representing 20 percent of Enka's
production capacity of aramid fiber. 197
In addition to this direct injury, Enka also alleged that its worldwide
sales position, including that in the EEC, would suffer a serious setback
due to the impossibility of participating in the technological development
of aramid fiber applications in the United States. 198 With respect to the
EEC in particular, Enka alleged that the exclusion from the U.S. market
for aramid fiber would have an indirect impact on its sales position. 199
e. Community Interest
Enka alleged that, given the importance of possible applications of
aramid fiber in technologically advanced products, and in view of the
illicit and injurious nature of the exclusion order of the USITC, it was in
the interest of the EEC to intervene with the aim of removing the injury
resulting from the U.S. import ban on aramid fiber. 20°

194. Initiated Complaint, supra note 2.
195. Id.

196. Id.at 3.
197. Id.
198. Id.

199. Id.
200. Id.
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f. Decision to Initiate Examination Procedure
The EEC Commission decided: "In view of the fact that the complaint
raises an important question on the interpretation of GATT which has,
as the facts of this case illustrate, considerable economic implications, it
is considered to be in the Community's interest to initiate an examination
procedure."

20 1

2. Substantive Aspects of the Conclusions
of the Examination Procedure

a. Determination by the EEC Commission
On March 20, 1987, at the end of the examination and investigation
procedures begun on February 5, 1986, the EEC Commission determined
that the application of section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended, for the purpose of excluding from the U.S. market aramid fiber
manufactured by the Akzo Group constituted an illicit commercial practice within the meaning of EEC Regulation 2641/84.202 Consequently, the
EEC Commission decided to initiate a consultation and dispute settlement
procedure as provided in GATT article XXIII. 20 3
b. Aim of the EEC Commission
The EEC Commission examined only one issue during its examination
and investigation: whether section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended, was compatible with GATT article 111.204 The EEC Commission
was concerned with whether the U.S. legislation as applied to the Akzo
Group for the purpose of excluding its aramid fiber from the U.S. market
constituted a violation of GATT article III, which prohibits domestic
provisions that discriminate against imported products in relation to domestic products. 20 5 The EEC Commission wanted to establish whether
the aramid fiber produced by the Akzo Group, which in the opinion of
the EEC Commission had been subjected to a procedure distinct from
that applied to U.S. manufactured aramid fiber, had thereby received less
20 6
favorable treatment.
c. Conclusions of the EEC Commission
The EEC Commission concluded that:
[S]ection 337 gives the USITC separate jurisdiction over imported products
and . . . that the Community producer does not enjoy the same possibilities for
201. Id.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

EEC Commission Press Release, supra note 183, at I.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
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defending himself before the USITC as he would have in a normal American
Court. Consequently, the procedure followed on the basis of section 337 is less
favorable than that which takes place in normal courts of law for goods produced
in the United States and is therefore contrary to [GATT article Ill]. The Commission takes the view that this constitutes an illicit commercial practice as
defined in Regulation . . .2641/84.

It concludes that it is in the Community interest to embark upon international
consultation and dispute settlement procedure [which would bring into line
United States legislation] with the United States' international obligations.
Akzo, as the complainant, demanded that retaliatory measures should be
taken against aramid fiber produced by du Pont. The Commission has indicated
that it is too soon to make a judgment about countermeasures. In any event,
iffollowing the reconciliation procedure, countermeasures should be envisaged,
their objective would be to correct the unacceptable provisions of [section] 337
2 07
and[not] to compensate [Akzo/ directly or indirectly, nor to penalize diuPont.

3. Summary

In the first complaint before the EEC Commission under Regulation
2641/84, "The New Instrument of Commercial Policy" has been used as
a sword by the EEC Commission in an attempt to protect certain of its
exports to the United States that are the subject of a valid U.S. patent
held by a U.S. patentee and that were excluded not by politicization but
rather by judicialization under section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930,
as amended. The EEC Commission correctly but haughtily concluded
that it did not seek to pronounce on the merits of the patent in question
nor on the matter of whether the procedures followed by the USITC were
in accordance with the U.S. Constitution.20 8 This shows an intrusion into
United States sovereignty by the EEC Commission in the first application
of Regulation 2641/84.
B.

THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LAW OF
SECTION 337 OF THE U.S. TARIFF ACT OF 1930

In order to understand the U.S. domestic law that triggered the first
complaint lodged with the EEC Commission under Regulation 2641/84,
investigation focuses on section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended, with respect to its (I) substantive and procedural law and (2)
relationship to GATT.
I. The Substantive Law of Section 337
Title 19 U.S.C. section 1337 is entitled "Unfair Practices in Import
Trade." 2 ° 9 Paragraph (a) provides that:

207. Id. (emphasis added).
208. Id.

209. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
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Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles
into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or
agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially
injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States,
or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize
trade and commerce in the United States, are declared unlawful, and when
found by the Commission [the USITC] to exist shall be dealt with, in addition
to any other provisions of law, as provided in this section. 210

Furthermore, Section 1337(a) of the U.S. Code is entitled "Importation
of Products Produced Under Process Covered by Claims of Unexpired
Patent" 2 11 and provides that:
The importation for use, sale, or exchange of a product made, produced,
processed, or mined under or by means of a process covered by the claims of
any unexpired valid United States letters patent, shall have the same status for
the purpose of section 1337 of this title as the importation of any product or
article covered by the claims of any unexpired valid United States letters patent. 212

It is the USITC to which Congress has delegated authority to determine
the impact of imports on U.S. industries. 21 3 The USITC consists of six
Commissioners who are appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. 2 14 The Commissioners are appointed for nine-year
terms and no more than three may be members of the same political party
as the President. 21 5 The President designates two of the Commissioners
as chairperson and vice-chairperson for two-year terms. 2 16 The President,
however, may not designate as chairperson either of the two Commissioners most recently appointed to the USITC, nor any Commissioner
who is a member of the same political party as the prior chairperson. 2 17
Additionally, the vice-chairperson cannot be a member of the same po-

litical party as the chairperson. 21 8 Although complainants before the
USITC, which are usually United States domestic manufacturers, often
prevail, favorable decisions are not politically motivated. They are due
solely to the probative weight of the evidence of record as made before
a federal administrative law judge whose independence is guaranteed by
the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act. 2 19 Thus, section 337 is not "pro-

210. Id. § 1337(a).
211. Id. § 1337a.
212. Id. Note the difference in citation. 19 U.S.C. § 1337a and 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) are
different sections of the U.S. Code.
213. Id. § 1336; Perry, Administrationof Import Trade Laws by the United States International Trade Commission, 3 B.U. INT'L L.J. 345, 347 (1985).

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Perry, supra note 213, at 347.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

219. Duvall, The Rule of Law in InternationalTrade: Litigating Unfair Trade Practice

Cases Before the United States International Trade Commission, 15 LAW AM. 31 (1983).
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tectionist" in the ideological sense; 220 rather, section 337 "seeks to encourage 'free' trade by providing adequate defenses against international
traders who engage in unfair acts or unfair methods of competition 22in1
violation of the established law and rules of trade in the United States."
To establish a violation of section 337, the complainant must prove the
following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (i) unfair methods
of competition or unfair acts, including, for example, patent infringement
or violation of the antitrust laws; in (2) the importation of articles into
the United States, or in their sale; (3) that will effectively destroy or
substantially injure or prevent the establishment of (4) an industry; (5)
efficiently and economically operated in the United States; (6) or will
222
restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States.
As section 337 does not explicitly define "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair acts," the USITC and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, the federal court to which a party adversely affected
by a decision of the USITC may appeal for judicial review, have broadly
interpreted the terms. 223 Unfair trade practices have been construed to
include: (1) patent, trademark, and copyright infringement; (2) misappropriation of trade secrets; and (3) antitrust violations such as palming off,
deceptive advertising, and product disparagement. 224 With specific reference to patent infringement, such as that claimed by du Pont against
the Akzo Group, the importation or sale of a product covered by a U.S.
patent has long been held to be an unfair method of competition or unfair
act under section 337.225 The USITC has held an unfair act to be not only
direct patent infringement, but also contributory patent infringement and
inducement to infringe a patent. 226 Additionally, if the product is made
by a patented process outside the United States, as claimed by du Pont
against the Akzo Group, the importation of the goods into the United
States results in an unfair act. 227 In considering whether patent infringement has been established, the USITC is guided, but not bound, by established U.S. patent law. 228 It has accepted the established defenses of:

At the time of writing his article, The Honorable Donald K. Duvall was Chief Administrative
Law Judge of the United States International Trade Commission and the former Chairperson
of the International Law and Practice Section of the American Bar Association.
220. Id.
22 I.
ld.
222. Id.
223. Lever, Unfair Methods of Competition in Import Trade: Actions Before the International Trade Commission, 41 Bus. LAW. 1165, 1169 (1986).

224. Duvall, supra note 219. at 32.
225. Lever, supra note 223, at 1169.
226. Id.
227. Id.

228. Id.
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lack of novelty, obviousness, estoppel, laches, and fraud. 229 As a result,
the presumption of validity that U.S. patents enjoy under federal patent
law can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the patent is
invalid or unenforceable by reason of the established defenses. 230 A determination by the USITC that the U.S. patent is invalid, however, is
only for the purpose of section 337; such a determination will not estop
concurrent or subsequent litigation in the federal courts by reason of res
23 1
judicata.
The USITC has consistently maintained with respect to infringement
of U.S. patents by imports that:
To argue that [issuing an exclusion order where there is patent infringement]
is overly broad misses the point of the philosophy underlying our [U.S.] patent
system and the systems of other countries. Only merchandise which appropriates the idea protected by the patent is excluded from this market. Noninfringing
merchandise may be imported into this country. With a narrowly drawn exclu-

sion order, the burden which is shifted to importers is not an unnecessary
burden
232
when compared to the scope of the patentholder's protection.

233
Thus, the USITC is compelled to protect patent monopoly rights.
The U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, now the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, upheld the USITC's compulsion to
protect patent monopoly rights when the court noted that importation of
merchandise infringing U.S. patents was a different situation from the
234
domestic manufacture of merchandise infringing U.S. patents:

In the case of the sale of articles manufactured in the United States the
infringing manufacturer can be proceeded against and thus the unfair practice
can be reached at its source. Domestic patentees have no effective means
through the courts of preventing the sale of imported merchandise in violation
of their patent rights ....

[The domestic patentee] is required to proceed

against each individual dealer selling the infringing articles, which of course
would lead to a multiplicity of suits with little likelihood that all infringing dealers

could be reached. The cost of numerous suits with the small amount of damages
which may be recovered in any one suit discourages resort to the courts.
Moreover, a decree obtained against any one dealer would have no binding
effect upon others, and by the simple expedient of changing the consignees the
effect of a decree when secured would be nullified. Unless, therefore, section
[337] may be invoked to reach the foreign articles at the time and place of
importation by forbidding entry into the United States of those articles which

229. Id.
230. Duvall, supra note 219, at 33.

23 I.
Id.
232. Fernicola, Scope of Action Against Unfair Import Trade Practices Under Section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 4 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 234, 310 (1982) (emphasis added)
(citing U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337 TA 52, Pub. No. 1017 (May 1978)).

233. Id.
234. Id. at 311.
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upon the facts of a particular case are found to violate rights of domestic
235
manufacturers, such domestic manufacturers have no adequate remedy.
Thus, under section 337, domestic patentees may gain a complete exclusion of articles that might possibly infringe their patents without the
inconvenience of proceeding in several federal courts to obtain limited
236
exclusion.
The USITC may award only certain remedies under section 337. These
include: permanent exclusion orders; temporary exclusion orders; and
cease and desist orders. 237 Exclusion orders are an in rem remedy and
may be of two kinds: general or limited. 238 When an exclusion order is
general, the U.S. Customs Service excludes all goods implicated in the
unfair acts and methods of competition in question from entry into the
United States. 239 When an exclusion order is limited, the U.S. Customs
Service excludes only those goods imported by the parties named by the
USITC. 240 Cease and desist orders, on the other hand, are an in personam
remedy and may be used by the USITC only against those parties over
which the USITC has established personal jurisdiction. 24 1 Cease and desist orders can be used to reach inventories of the goods that are the
subject of the unfair acts and methods of competition although the goods
have previously entered the United States. 242 The USITC may impose a
24 3
set amount of damages per day for violations of cease and desist orders.
Although a complainant can prove that it has met the elements necessary to establish a violation of section 337, relief in the form of the
remedies the USITC may award does not follow automatically. 244 A respondent may defeat imposition of relief in two ways: by showing during
the review before the USITC that relief is not in the public interest, or
by persuading the President through the USTR that policy reasons disfavor the imposition of relief.245 Thus, relief under section 337 is not a
certainty even when the elements necessary to establish a violation of
246
section 337 have been proven.
235. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247, 260
(C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 852 (1930)).
236. Id. at 312.
237. Newman & Lipman, Representing Respondents in a Section 337 Investigation of the
United States International Trade Commission, 20 INT'l LAW. 1187, 1191 (1986): 19 U.S.C.
§§ 137(d)-(f)(l) (1982).
238. Newman & Lipman, supra note 237, at 1191.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(2) (1982).
244. Newman & Lipman, supra note 237, at 1191.
245. Id.: 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g).
246. Newman & Lipman, supra note 237, at 1191.
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2. The Procedural Law of Section 337
A case under section 337 before the USITC is called an investigation
and is conducted in accordance with the U.S. Administrative Procedure
247
The following represents a typical schedule of section 337
Act.
investigations:
Filing of the complaint; investigation initiated or complaint dismissed within
thirty days of filing.
Notice of investigation published in the Federal Register.
Response filed within twenty days of date notice is published in the Federal
Register.
Discovery period ends approximately four to five months after the institution

of the investigation.
Hearing preparation and hearing before the Administrative Law Judge occur
approximately five to six months after the institution of the investigation.
Briefing by the parties occurs six to seven months after the [institution of
the investigation].
Initial determination by the Administrative Law Judge occurs seven to eight
months after the institution of the investigation; rules require that the initial
determination must be issued within sixty days of the close of the hearing.2 48
Commission determination must be rendered by end of twelve months.

Unlike the notice pleading complaint filed in federal district courts, the
allegations raised in a section 337 complaint must be supported by detailed
249
statements of facts and certain documentary and physical exhibits.
Also, the USITC's rules require the response to a complaint to contain
250
more information than an answer to a complaint in federal district courts.
Some of this additional information includes: statistical data on the quantity and value of imports; statement of the respondent's capacity to produce the subject article; and the significance of the U.S. market to the
respondent's operations. 25' One of these additional items of information
be pleaded with as much specconcerns affirmative defenses that "shall
252
ificity as possible in the response."
Also unlike practice in the federal district courts, a respondent in a
section 337 investigation cannot file counterclaims as neither section 337
nor the rules of the USITC provide for them. 253 If a "respondent has
sufficient domestic activities and a complainant has sufficient import activity," however, a "respondent may be able to file its own complaint

247. Weiss, Section 337: An Activist I.T.C., 14 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 905, 913 (1982).
248. Lever, supra note 223, at 1181.
249. Budoff, A Practitioner'sGuide to Section 337 Litigation Before the International
Trade Commission, 17 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 519. 523-24 (1985).
250. Budoff, supra note 249, at 535.
251. Id. at 535 n. 85; 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.21(b) (c) (1986).
252. Budoff, supra note 249, at 535; 19 C.F.R. § 210.21(b) (1986).
253. Budoff, supra note 249, at 536.
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against the complainant in a separate action and, upon institution, then
move to consolidate the actions." 254 More commonly, respondents file
Office, for exconcurrent agency proceedings (before the U.S. Patent
255
ample), or judicial proceedings in the federal courts.
After the complaint and response have been filed and discovery has
closed, the parties to a section 337 investigation present their evidence
to the administrative law judge at a hearing. 256 The administrative law
judge writes an initial determination consisting of an opinion based on
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 257 A party may request that this
initial determination be reviewed by the USITC which may affirm, reverse, modify, or remand in whole or in part. 258 The initial determination
will become a final determination if the USITC does not review the initial
determination. 259 If the USITC grants one or more forms of relief, the
260
USITC decision is reviewed by the President before it becomes final.
The President has rarely disapproved decisions of the USITC. 26 1 Any
USITC may appeal
party adversely affected by a final determination of the 262
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
3. The Relationship of GATT to Section 337

The question of whether section 337 is consistent with GATT turns on
whether imported goods are treated less favorably than domestic goods
in the United States. 263 If imported goods are discriminated against by
the application of section 337, then such discrimination can be challenged
as a nontariff barrier to trade because the key element of GATT is that
protection from import competition should only be extended to domestic
industries through the assessment of tariffs and not through the imposition
of nontariff barriers. 264 Two arguments may be made in support of the
compatibility of section 337 with GATT, however. First, so long as injury
to domestic products by foreign imports remains an element to be proven
in a section 337 investigation, it is difficult to argue discrimination against
the foreign imports. 265 In the case of patents, GATT regards a country's
favoring of particular domestic industries as the legitimate exercise of
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id.
Id.
Lever, supra note 223, at 1182.
Id.

258. Id.

259. Id.
260. Id.

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
Id.
Lever, supra note 223, at 1184.
Id. at 1184 n.134.
See id. at 1184.
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national sovereignty. 266 Second, GATT has served as the framework of
international trade since 1948 and the substantive law of section 337 has
remained unchanged since 1930.267 When GATT became effective, existing laws were exempted from its provisions by virtue of a grandfather
268
clause.
The case of first impression under Regulation 2641/84 before the EEC
Commission is not the first case to challenge a section 337 decision of the
USITC with respect to GATT. The nondiscrimination principle has recently been the subject of two GATT panel reports on complaints brought
by Canada against the United States pursuant to GATT dispute settlement
procedures. 269 The first report concerned an exclusion order issued by
the USITC against certain automotive parts imported in violation of a
U.S. patent. The GATT panel concluded that the nondiscrimination test
was satisfied because the order operated against imports from all foreign
sources and not those only of Canadian origin. 270 The second report
concerned United States import restrictions following the seizure of several fishing vessels by Canada. 27 1 The GATT panel concluded that the
import restrictions were not necessarily arbitrary or unjustifiable because
the same import restrictions had been imposed on other countries that
had seized vessels. 272 In addition, the first GATT panel concluded that
there was no disguised restriction on international trade concerning the
automotive parts because the USITC order was limited to those articles
imported in breach of patent. 27 3 The second GATT panel concluded that
there was no disguised restriction on international trade concerning the
import restriction retaliation for the seizure of vessels because the motives
274
of the United States were explicitly stated.
4. Summary
Section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, provides the
legal mechanism whereby U.S. domestic patentees may protect their patented products from infringement by foreign imports. The substantive and
procedural aspects of section 337 afford constitutional due process and
parallel the procedures used in federal district courts and in some circumstances are more explicit and demanding of information than proce-

266. Note, supra note 147, at 489.
267. Lever. supra note 223, at 1184 n.136.

268. Id.
269. McGovern, supra note 148, at 399.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 399-400.

272. Id. at 400.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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dures used in federal district courts. Section 337 is also consistent with
GATT as decided by two recent GATT panel investigations.
C. THE ORIGINAL CLAIM BY DU PONT AGAINST AKZO
BEFORE THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

In order to understand how the law in the United States that triggered
the first complaint lodged with the EEC Commission under Regulation
2641/84 was applied, this investigation focuses first on the original claim
by du Pont against Akzo before the USITC pursuant to section 337 and
then on the European response to the outcome of the claim.
I. The Original Claim
On April 18, 1984, du Pont filed a complaint alleging that Akzo had
engaged in unfair methods of competition and unfair acts including the
importation, sale, and marketing in the United States of certain aramid
by
fiber produced in The Netherlands by a process purportedly covered 27
5
patent).
'756
(the
3,767,756
patent
letters
U.S.
Pont's
du
of
claims
the
Additionally, the complaint alleged Akzo attempted to exploit applications
of aramid fiber and to penetrate markets for aramid fiber created by du
Pont. 276 Lastly, the complaint alleged that the effect or tendency of the
unfair methods of competition and unfair acts was to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the
277
United States.
Aramid fibers are the strongest commercial synthetic fibers known to
humankind as they are about five times stronger than steel on an equal
weight basis. 278 The '756 patent for the process of creating aramid fiber
was issued on October 23, 1973, to a research scientist employed by
du Pont and immediately assigned to the company. 279 The patent describes
a method that produces a high-strength synthetic polyamide fiber that
du Pont markets under the trade name Kevlar.280 It has been marketed
by du Pont for use including, but not limited to, roping, spacecraft and
28
airplane parts, bullet resistant clothing and armor, tires, and boat hulls. '
Kevlar has been used as a substitute for steel, aluminum, asbestos, nylon,

275. Akzo N.Y. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 1475.
Id.
Id. at n.2.
Id. at 1477.

280. Polyamides are polymers containing amide linkages. Aromatic polymers are poly-

amides where the radicals linking the amide linages constitute aromatic radicals. The polymer
described in claim 13 of the '756 patent is a wholly aromatic para positioned polyamide. Id.
28 1. Id.
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rayon, polyester, cotton, or cotton fiber. 282 Kevlar is available as either
a continuous rope or filament, or alternatively as a staple or pulp. 283 Staple
consists of short filaments that can be spun into yarn, whereas pulp is
284
ground fiber most often used as an asbestos substitute.
In addition to obtaining the '756 patent in the United States for Kevlar,
du Pont, as of the date of filing its complaint before the USITC, had
obtained patents corresponding to the '756 patent in the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, East Germany
(abandoned), Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru (expired), Poland, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, United
Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Venezuela (expired).
Foreign patent applications were also pending in Denmark, West Ger285
many, Korea, The Netherlands, and Norway.
Du Pont claimed that in September 1983 Akzo had imported aramid fiber
manufactured in The Netherlands and sold it to China Grove Cotton Mills
286
Co., China Grove, North Carolina, a substantial purchaser of Kevlar.
Also, du Pont claimed that in October 1983 Akzo called to discuss its aramid fiber with Whitehill Manufacturing Co., Lima, Pennsylvania, another
substantial purchaser of Kevlar. 287 Lastly, du Pont claimed Akzo made sales
presentations and/or provided samples of its aramid fiber to other Kevlar
purchasers and potential customers in the United States including: Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, Armstrong Rubber Company, Uniroyal
Tire Company, Gates Rubber Company, Eaton Corporation, Clark Schwebel Fiber Glass Corporation, America & Efird Thread Mills, Hood Sail
288
Makers, and Point Blank Body Armor, Inc.
On June 19, 1984, Akzo filed its response and denied du Pont's complaint. 289 Akzo also pleaded ten affirmative defenses in which all possible
29
attacks on the '756 patent permitted by the USITC rules were raised.
On May 9, 1985, the administrative law judge issued a 454-page initial
determination 29 1 based on the record made at fourteen days of hearing

282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.

285. In re Certain Aramid Fibers, USITC Pub., Inv. No. 337-TA-194. Complaint at I113 (Apr. 18, 1984).

286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 23.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
In re Certain Aramid Fibers, USITC Pub., Inv. No. 337-TA-194, Response at 1-17

(June 19, 1984).

290. Id. at 18-26.
291. In re Certain Aramid Fibers, USITC Pub., Inv. No. 337-TA-194, Initial Determination
(May 9, 1985).
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and found in favor of du Pont. 292 The USITC concurred with the decision
of the administrative law judge, and the USITC's order became final on
29 3
January 25, 1986, when the President declined to overrule it.
2. The European Response
The EEC's reaction to the initial determination of the administrative
law judge was negative. On July 26, 1985, the Delegation of the EEC
Commission in Washington, D.C., informed the U.S. Department of State
by memorandum that:
The Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities ... wishes
to reiterate its concerns expressed ... on the procedural rules for investigation
under section 337 ....

The Delegation regrets that its comments were not incorporated when the
final procedural rules were established. These procedures are consideredby the
European Communities as a harassment of them compared to U.S. companies
subject to U.S. internalpatentlaw. The Delegation recalls that for these reasons
the European Communities requested in September 1982 in a notification to
294
GATT that section 337 procedure be included in the list of non-tariff barriers.

Thus, as early as 1982, prior to the adoption of Regulation 2641/84 and
the commencement of the aramid fiber case before the USITC, the EEC
Commission looked upon section 337 with disfavor.
The Dutch Government's reaction to the initial determination of the
administrative law judge was also negative. On August 1, 1985, the Royal
Netherlands Embassy in Washington, D.C., informed the U.S. Department of State by memorandum that:
The Embassy has the honor to inform the Department of State that The
Netherlands Government wishes to associate itself with the expression of concern by the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities in its

Note of July 26, 1985, to the Department of State on the procedural rules for
investigation under section 337....

Generally it is in the interest of the consumers in both the U.S. and Europe
to have the broadest choice possible also in a range of technologically advanced

products. It is not a public interest to maintain a de facto monopoly of one
producer in the U.S., which could even further be enhanced by [a USITC]
decision to issue an exclusion orderfor Twaron [Akzo's aramid fiber].
In The Netherlands, Akzo does not encounter any legal obstacles in producing
its aramid
fiber due to the fact that du Pont's patents applications have been
2 95
denied.

292. Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1475-76.
293. Id. at 1476.
294. Memorandum from the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities,
Washington, D.C., to the U.S. Dep't of State, Washington, D.C. at 1 (July 26, 1985) (emphasis added).
295. Memorandum from the Royal Netherlands Embassy, Washington, D.C., to the U.S.
Dep't. of State, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 1, 1985) at 1-3 (emphasis added).
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Thus, it appears from the memorandum to the Department of State that
the Dutch Government would protect the Dutch patent for aramid fiber
issued to a Dutch company, but it would deny to the United States the
same right to protect the U.S. patent for aramid fiber issued to a U.S.
company.
3. Summary

The USITC determined pursuant to section 337 to exclude the importation of Dutch-manufactured aramid fiber because it infringed upon the
rights of the U.S. patentee in the manufacture of aramid fiber in the United
States, and it also threatened to injure an efficiently and economically
run industry. Patent counsel for the Dutch company admitted in previously
unsuccessful federal court litigation which attempted to challenge the U.S.
patent that "It's been admitted that they [U.S.-manufactured aramid fiber
29 6
and Dutch-manufactured aramid fiber] are made in the same way."

They "are for all practical purposes identical." 297 Regulation 2641/84
provided the legal mechanism whereby the EEC could propel its position
with respect to section 337 in general, and the Dutch position with respect
to aramid fiber in particular, before the Contracting Parties to GATT.
D.

THE APPEAL BY AKZO AGAINST DU PONT
BEFORE THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT

In order to understand the law in the United States that was affirmed
and that triggered the first complaint lodged with the EEC Commission
under Regulation 2641/84, this investigation focuses on the appeal by Akzo

before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit of the original
claim by du Pont against Akzo before the USITC pursuant to section 337.
1. The Appeal
Although the first complaint under Regulation 2641/84 was lodged on

December 9, 1985,298 it was not until December 22, 1986, that the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the final determination
of the USITC to exclude the importation of Dutch-manufactured aramid
fiber into the United States. 299 Akzo had raised the following issues on
appeal:
296. USITC Complaint, Exhibit 11, excerpt from Transcript of Oral Argument on Motion
to Dismiss, Enka B.V. v. E. 1. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 80-358, at 32, lines 13-14
(D. Del. Dec. 10, 1980).
297. Id. at 32, lines 12-13.
298. 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 25) 2 (1986).
299. See Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1471.
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(I) whether the Commission's finding that claim 13 of the '756 patent was
"not invalid" and "not unenforceable" is supported by substantial evidence;
(2) whether Akzo's due process and treaty rights were violated in the Commission proceeding;
(3) whether the Commission, as a non-article III [of the U.S. Constitution]
tribunal, is constitutionally prohibited from adjudicating the validity and enforceability of patents;
(4) whether the Commission's finding that Akzo's sales of aramid fibers in
the United States would have a tendency to "destroy or substantially injure"
an industry economically and efficiently operated is supported by substantial
evidence;
(5) whether the Commission's conclusion that du Pont's value-in-use pricing
did not violate the antitrust laws is correct and supported by substantial evidence; and

(6) whether it is a defense to du Pont's complaint that du Pont
employed a
300
solvent included in a polymerization process patented by Akzo.

The major substantive question as posed by Akzo's issues on appeal
was the validity and enforceability of du Pont's U.S. '756 patent for the
manufacture of aramid fiber. 30 1 The major procedural question as posed
by Akzo's issues on appeal was whether Akzo was denied due process
because du Pont's confidential documents were not disclosed to Akzo's
management. 30 2 It should be noted, however, that although Akzo's first
issue on appeal was "whether the Commission's finding that claim 13 of
the '756 patent was 'not invalid' and 'not unenforceable' is supported by
substantial evidence," 30 3 Akzo presented no argument that if claim 13 of
the '756 patent was valid and enforceable, Akzo would not infringe the
30 4
patent if it used the same process in the United States.
2. Summary
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rendered an extensive, thirty-nine page slip opinion 30 5 in which it affirmed the final decision
of the USITC. 30 6 If the Dutch Government and the EEC Commission had
respected the judicial process in the United States, then the first complaint
under Regulation 2641/84 would have been lodged after, and not before,
the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had been
rendered.

300. Id. at 1476 (footnote omitted).
301. Id. at 1475.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1476.
304. Id.
305. At one point in the decision, the three judge panel writes that Akzo "apparently
employ[ed] the 'kitchen sink' or 'let's try anything' approach for appellate advocacy." Id.
at 1488.
306. Id. at 1471.
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AND

ALLEGATIONS TO

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM

The main contention that Akzo raised in its complaint lodged under
Regulation 2641/84 as a result of the litigation pursuant to section 337 was
whether Akzo had been discriminated against before the USITC because
of its Dutch nationality when compared to U.S. companies. 30 7 Akzo has
been able to politicize the situation by means of Regulation 2641/84, which
relies upon the dispute settlement mechanisms of GATT. 30 8 This can be
seen from the following communication transmitted July 2, 1987, by the
Permanent Delegation of the EEC Commission in Geneva, Switzerland,
to GATT headquarters also located there:
On 23 April 1987 the European Community requested consultations with the

United States under Article XXIII: I of the General Agreement concerning the
application of section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act [of] 1930 (document L/6160).
The request for consultations resulted from an examination of a specific case
where for the purpose of enforcing private intellectual property rights imported
goods were subjected to a separate and distinct procedure solely by virtue of
their non U.S. origin. The [EEC] considered that a denial of national treatment
within the meaning of Article IIIof the General Agreement resulted from the
different rules applicable under section 337 and that this denial does not fall
within the provisions of Article XX(d) of the General Agreement. The [EEC]
therefore considers the benefits accruing to it under the General Agreement are
being nullified and impaired through the application of the provisions of section

337.
Despite repeated attempts to arrange for consultations to take place this has
proved difficult. The earliest date that could be arranged is 10 July next [1987].
In these circumstances, and in the event that no mutually satisfactory agreement
is found in the intervening period, the [EEC] hereby requests that the GATT
Council, at its meeting on 15 July 1987, establish a panel to examine this 3°matter
9
and to make such findings or recommendations as may be appropriate.

Unfortunately for Akzo, its plea to GATT "misses the mark." 3 10 As
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated, and which any
GATT panel should note:
The appropriate inquiry is whether Akzo was afforded the same rights afforded to domestic firms in a section 337 proceeding before the Commission.
Clearly, Akzo has failed to demonstrate that it suffered from discriminatory
treatment. First,. . . both Akzo and du Pont were bound by identical procedures
regarding confidentiality and discovery .... Second, the same argument was
rejected in Certain Spring Assemblies and Components Thereofs [which was

307.
308.
309.
310.

See supra text accompanying note 194.
See supra text accompanying notes 158-59.
GATT, Doc. L/6198 at 1 (July 3, 1987).
Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1485.
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311
the subject of a GATT panel review where no discrimination was found. ] In
that case, respondent unsuccessfully raised certain U.S. Canadian treaties as
a defense to enforcement of [Section] 337. The Commission observed:

Section 337 does not discriminate against foreign corporations by virtue
of their foreign status. It applies to foreign and domestic corporations alike.
Section 337 gives the Commission jurisdiction over products imported from
a foreign country, even if they are manufacturedand/or imported by a U.S.
corporation. The Commission's jurisdiction lies in unfair acts occurring in
or their sale,
connection with the importation of goods into the United States
312
and it extends to all persons engaged in such unfair acts.

Thus, as the substantive and procedural law of section 337 is applied
equally to foreign and domestic parties alike before the USITC, Akzo
has no complaint of discrimination before GATT.
In conclusion, the application of Regulation 2641/84 vis t vis GATT
against section 337 demonstrates the intrusion of supranational and international law into the domain of national law and shows an attack 3by
13
the EEC vis-.-vis GATT against the sovereignty of the United States.
F. CONCLUSION

The alleged illicit commercial practice of the U.S. Government in the
first complaint under Regulation 2641/84 was to deny equal treatment to
Akzo under section 337 with respect to the exclusion from the United
States of aramid fiber manufactured in The Netherlands that infringed
upon a valid U.S. patent held by du Pont. 3 14 Akzo's contentions with
respect to its complaint under Regulation 2641/84 are without merit when
viewed in the light of the substantive and procedural law of section 337.
With respect to Akzo's first contention under Regulation 2641/84,315
the Dutch company had no basis to claim that it was subjected in the
proceeding before the USITC to procedural discrimination that would not
have arisen in ordinary patent litigation in federal courts as regards prod-

ucts manufactured in the United States. First, the proper test for discrimination is not whether Akzo would not have been subject to it in the
federal courts. The proper test is whether Akzo was the subject of discrimination before the USITC. Second, Akzo had filed patent litigation
in the federal courts contesting du Pont's '756 patent for Kevlar aramid
fiber prior to when du Pont had filed its claim against Akzo before the
USITC pursuant to section 337.316
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

See supra text accompanying notes 269-74.
Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1485 (emphasis in original; citation omitted).
See supra text accompanying note 171.
See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
See supra text accompanying note 194.
USITC Complaint, Exhibit 15, at I; Enka B. v. E. 1. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
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Akzo was subject to the same procedural law before the USITC as was
the claimant du Pont and as would be any United States domestic respondent. 31 7 Also, Akzo had previously filed suit against du Pont in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware and in the U.S. District
Court for the District of North Carolina. 3 18 In both court actions Akzo
sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity and unenforceability of du
Pont's '756 patent for Kevlar aramid fiber. 3 19 The first action was commenced July 30, 1980, and was terminated April 12, 1982, at Akzo's
request, dismissing Akzo's appeal following an opinion of the federal
district court dismissing Akzo's claim without prejudice. 320 The court
held that since Akzo did not manufacture any aramid fiber in the United
States and had no intention of doing so, du Pont's '756 patent for Kevlar
aramid fiber was not implicated in Akzo's activities in the United States
and thus there was no case or controversy arising under the U.S. patent
laws. 32 1 The second action was commenced October 12, 1983, had been
transferred from the Western District of North Carolina to the District of
Delaware, and was still pending when du Pont filed its claim against Akzo
before the USITC pursuant to section 337.322 Therefore, there was no
merit to Akzo's first contention under Regulation 2641/84.
With respect to Akzo's second contention under Regulation 2641/84,323
the Dutch company had no basis to claim that it was unable to raise
counterclaims as regards alleged infringements by du Pont of Akzo's U.S.
patent process. First, Akzo could raise such claims in the patent litigation
still pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware when
du Pont filed its claim against Akzo before the USITC pursuant to section
337.324 Second, Akzo had also filed other patent litigation in the federal
courts. Akzo filed suit against du Pont in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia alleging du Pont infringed Akzo's U.S. patent
4,308,374 (the '374 patent) on a polymerization solvent system used in
the formulation of the polymer that is spun into aramid fiber by means of
du Pont's '756 patent process. 325 Therefore, there was no merit to Akzo's
second contention under Regulation 2641/84.

No. 80-358 (D. Del. filed July 30, 1980); Akzona, Inc. v. E. 1. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
No. 83-385 (W.D.N.C. filed Oct. 12, 1983) [hereinafter USITC Complaint, Exhibit 15].
317. See supra text accompanying note 312.
318. See supra note 316.

319. USITC Complaint, Exhibit 15, supra note 316, at 1-2.
320. Id.

321. Id. at 2.
322. Id. at 3.
323. See supra text accompanying note 194.
324. USITC Complaint, Exhibit 15, supra note 316, at 1.

325. Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1489.
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With respect to Akzo's third contention under Regulation 2641/84,326
there was no basis for the Dutch company's claim that being deprived of
the possibility to raise counterclaims, Akzo was unable to contest du
Pont's standing of "U.S. aramid fiber industry." According to Akzo, there
would be no U.S. aramid fiber industry but with the infringement of Akzo's
'374 U.S. patent process. Akzo did contest du Pont's standing of "U.S.
aramid fiber industry" in the patent litigation Akzo had filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. That litigation was
adversely decided against Akzo, the court holding that the Akzo '374
patent was invalid for obviousness, and du Pont had the legal right to do
the act Akzo had claimed as an infringement. 327 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court that affirmed the final determination
of the USITC to exclude Akzo's aramid fiber from importation into the
United States, also affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia. 328 Therefore, there was no merit to Akzo's
third contention under Regulation 2641/84.
The original patent litigation seeking a declaratory judgment of invalidity and unenforceability of du Pont's '756 patent for Kevlar aramid fiber
had been transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of North Carolina to the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware
prior to when du Pont had filed its complaint against Akzo before the
USITC pursuant to section 337. The original litigation against du Pont
was then consolidated on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit with the litigation Akzo had filed against du Pont in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia concerning the
alleged infringement of Akzo's '374 U.S. patent process. 329 Thus, the
U.S. federal courts held that: (I) the Akzo '374 U.S. patent on polymerization solvent system used in the formulation of the polymer which is
spun into aramid fiber by means of du Pont's '756 U.S. patent process
was invalid for obviousness; (2) du Pont had the legal right to do the act
Akzo had claimed to be an infringement upon its '374 U.S. patent process;
and (3) Akzo had no standing to seek a declaratory judgment of invalidity
and unenforceability of du Pont's '756 U.S. patent for Kevlar aramid fiber
because there was no case or controversy arising under U.S. patent law
since Akzo did not manufacture any aramid fiber in the United States and
had no intention of doing so. In addition, the USITC held that du Pont's
'756 patent was valid and that importation of Dutch manufactured aramid
326. See supra text accompanying note 194.
327. Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1489-90.
328. Id. at 1490; N.V. Akzo v. E. 1. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 810 F.2d 1148 (Fed. Cir.
1987).

329. Akzo, 810 F.2d at 1148.
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fiber into the United States infringed du Pont's '756 patent for Kevlar
aramid fiber. It is significant that the EEC has made no mention of the
patent litigation in the United States federal courts in any official publication open to public inspection concerning the first complaint lodged
under Regulation 2641/84. Thus, the EEC has tended to give a false impression of the judicial process in the United States concerning the aramid
fiber patents and also a false impression of the administrative process in
the United States concerning the procedural law of section 337.
The judicial process in the United States is held to be nonpolitical due
to the constitutional separation of powers among the three branches of
government. Thus, the decision rendered in the federal courts adverse to
Akzo was purely nonpolitical in nature and thereby nondiscriminatory in
nature concerning nationality. The administrative process before the USITC
is held to be nonpolitical for the following reasons. First, the administrative law judge is bound by the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act, which
is consistent with the procedural law of the judicial branch of government.
Second, one half of the Commissioners of the USITC cannot be of the
same political party as the President. Third, the chairperson of the USITC
cannot be of the same political party as the President. Thus, the decision
rendered by the USITC adverse to Akzo was purely nonpolitical in nature
and thereby nondiscriminatory in nature concerning nationality. The referral by the EEC to GATT for panel review of the exclusion of Dutchmanufactured aramid fiber from the United States and the U.S. domestic
law as to how this result was determined not only politicizes the judicialization of international trade law but also infringes upon the sovereignty of the United States vis-a-vis its domestic judicial and administrative
processes. The underlying question is: When is a domestic patent ever
valid and enforceable against foreign infringement?
III. Conclusion
The substantive and procedural law of Section 301 of the U.S. Trade
Act of 1974, as amended, is the legal mechanism whereby private parties
in the United States may invoke the intervention of the U.S. Government
against unfair trade practices of foreign countries. It served as the basis
for the drafting of EEC Regulation 2641/84, which is the legal mechanism
whereby private parties in Member States of the EEC may invoke the
intervention of the EEC Commission against illicit commercial practices
of non-Member States. Although both a response to and a retaliation
against section 301, Regulation 2641/84 was drafted to follow GATT dispute settlement procedures and thus to be in accord with international
law. Regulation 2641/84, however, may be used both as a sword and as a
shield: a sword to eliminate economic injury outside the EEC due to
WINTER 1988
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exports to non-Member States and a shield to eliminate economic injury
inside the EEC due to imports from non-Member States. Regulation
2641/84 was used as a sword in the first complaint lodged under "The
New Instrument of Commercial Policy" in the EEC.
Aramid fiber is the strongest synthetic fiber known to humankind. The
American company E. 1. du Pont de Nemours and Co. is the only manufacturer of aramid fiber in the United States and holds the U.S. patent
for its manufacture. The Dutch company Akzo N.V. is the only manufacturer of aramid fiber in the EEC. Using Regulation 2641/84, Akzo
challenged the substantive and procedural law of section 337 of the U.S.
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, which is the legal mechanism whereby
private parties in the United States may invoke the intervention of the
U.S. Government against foreign imports that infringe upon valid U.S.
patents and threaten to injure an industry economically and efficiently
operated. Akzo claimed under Regulation 2641/84 that the U.S. Government had committed an illicit commercial practice in the exclusion from
the United States of aramid fiber manufactured in The Netherlands and
imported by the Dutch company. In a subsequent appeal against the
USITC determination to exclude the Dutch-manufactured aramid fiber
from the United States and in concurrent federal court litigation challenging the validity of the U.S. patent for aramid fiber, the judicial branch
of the U.S. Government determined that: (I) du Pont's U.S. patent for
aramid fiber was valid; (2) the importation of Dutch-manufactured aramid
fiber into the United States infringed du Pont's patent and threatened to
injure an industry efficiently and economically operated; and (3) Akzo
had no standing to challenge the validity of du Pont's patent for aramid
fiber because Akzo neither manufactured aramid fiber in the United States
nor had any intention of doing so. As the judicial branch of government
in the United States is or should be free from political motivation in the
determination of legal disputes, it can be said that Akzo's contentions
were fairly and equitably decided in the United States and that Akzo was
subject to no discrimination of any kind because of its Dutch nationality.
Akzo had its "day in court" and lost.
The U.S. Government committed no illicit commercial practice in the
exclusion of Dutch-manufactured aramid fiber imported by Akzo because
first such importation infringed a valid U.S. patent and threatened to injure
an industry efficiently and economically operated in the United States,
and second, such a determination under section 337 is consistent with
GATT article XX(d). An affirmative finding of illicit commercial practices
on the part of the U.S. Government by the EEC Commission therefore
incorrectly applies Regulation 2641/84.
In final conclusion, Akzo merely seeks by any and all means possible
to import its Dutch-manufactured aramid fiber into the United States prior
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to the expiration of du Pont's valid patent for the same product. Having
lost its case under the application of national law, Akzo has, by means
of supranational law, turned to the processes of international law in a
political attempt to challenge the sovereignty of the United States vis-.vis its domestic law and administrative and judicial procedures.
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